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This paper introduces a new tool for measuring relative pay within organisations, which we 
call the “pay parity (PP) matrix” and discusses its advantages and useful properties. The PP matrix 
allows us to conveniently measure, and draw inferences about, the nature of the whole remuneration 
schedule, such as its gradient and smoothness. We illustrate the application of the PP matrix by 
using data on the remuneration of academic executives. This tool has wider uses whenever matrix 
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1. Introduction 
Consider an organisation that has n levels of employees with level 1 the highest paying and level n  
the lowest; denote by  i P  the pay received by those at level i, so the remuneration schedule is  1 n P , ,P … . 
How can we efficiently summarise the distribution of pay within the organisation? In this paper, we show 
this  apparently  innocuous  question  leads  to  further  questions  and  issues  that  are  quite  rich  in  their 
implications. We start by discussing alternative ways of measuring relative pay, which leads to what we 
call the “the pay parity matrix”, a matrix that compares the pay at each level with all others. This is 
followed by a detailed statistical analysis of the properties of the matrix and we show how it can be used 
to conveniently summarise the schedule it terms of its gradient and degree of “smoothness”. Toward the 
end  of  the  paper,  we  illustrate  the  estimation  of  the  PP  matrix  with  data  drawn  from  a  number  of 
organisations. 
2. Possible Measures of Relative Pay 
One  approach  to  relative  pay  is  to  express  each  level  of  pay  as  a  deviation  from  the  top, 
i 1 P P , i 2, ,n. − = …  But as these differences are expressed in dollars whose value changes from year to 
year and country to country, this is not the best way to proceed. Two related unit-free measures, the ratio 
i1 i 1 R P P =   and  the  percentage  difference  ( ) i1 i 1 1 P 100 P P P ′ = × − ( ) i1 100 R 1 = × − ,  are  also  possible 
measures. While these represent improvements over the difference, they are still not wholly satisfactory.  
Instead we use the logarithmic ratio, defined as  ( ) i1 i1 i 1 logR log P P π = = , which we shall call the “parity” 
between the remuneration of level  i  and that of the top. The advantages of this parity measure are 
outlined below. 
Consider the more general case of the comparison of remuneration at level i with any other level j, 
which may be above or below i. For each pair of levels ( ) i, j , i, j 1, ,n, = …  denote the ratio of  i P  to  j P  by 
ij i j R P P = ,  the  percentage  difference  by  ( ) ( ) ij i j j ij P 100 P P P 100 R 1 ′ = × − = × −   and  the  parity  by 
( ) ij i j log P P π = . The relationship between the percentage difference and the parity is  ( )
ij
ij P 100 e 1
π ′ = × − .  
Figure 1 illustrates the relation between the three measures of relative pay, the ratio, the percentage 
difference and the logarithmic ratio. When level i is below j, the ratio ij ij ij R 1, P 0 and  0 ′ < < π < , and vice 
versa when i > j. For example, when the remuneration at level i is one-half that of j, the ratio  ij R 1 2, =  
the percentage difference  ij P 50 ′ = −  percent and the parity  ij 100 69 π × = − . As can be seen from the figure, 
the percentage difference is never less than the parity ( ) 100 ×  and when the two levels of pay i and j are 
sufficiently “close”,  ij ij ij R 1, and P 100 ′ ≈ ≈ ×π .  
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The use of the parity  ij π  to make relative comparisons between different levels of remuneration 
has three distinct advantages:  
1.  Independence of irrelevant levels. Consider the percentage difference between the pay at levels i 
and j, and that between the adjacent level i-1 and j,  ij i 1,j P  and P− ′ ′ , respectively. Can these be used to 
compare  pay  at  levels  i  and  i-1?  The  difference  between  these  two  percentages  is 
( ) ij i 1,j i i 1 j P P 100 P P P − − ′ ′ − = × − , which is the difference in pay between levels i and i-1  as a percentage of 
that of level  j. This measure is a bit cumbersome as it involves a three-way comparison of levels i, i-1 
and  j.  By  contrast,  the  difference  in  the  corresponding  parities  is 
( ) ( ) ( ) ij i 1,j i j i 1 j i i 1 log P P log P P log P P − − − π −π = − = , which has no such problem as it involves a direct 
comparison of only the pay at the relevant two levels, with no reference to that of the irrelevant base  j.  
In other words, the difference in the parities  ij i 1,j − π −π  is just the parity of level  i  relative to level  i-1, 
viz.,  i.i 1 − π .  This attractive “triangularity” property carries over to all higher-order comparisons of the 
form  i,i k ij i k,j ± ± π = π −π , where the comparator level can be either below (for k < 0) or above ( k > 0) the 
initial  level   i.  In this  sense,  the  parity  is independent of irrelevant  levels, or  more  simply, is base 
invariant. 
2.  Symmetry.  Suppose that an employee at level  i  earns  0 β >  percent less than the highest-paid 
employee  of  the  organisation  (“the  boss”),  so  that  i1 P 0 ′ = −β< .  As  percentage  differences  are  not 
symmetric, that is ( ) ( ) 1 i i i 1 1 P P P P P P 100 − ≠ − − =β , the boss does not earn β  percent more than level 
i,  which  seems  contradictory.  The  parity,  by  contrast,  is  not  subject  to  this  asymmetry  as 
( ) i1 1 i 1i log P P −π = = π ; in words, if i earns  i1 0 −π >  less than the boss, then the boss earns  i1 π  more than i. 
3.  Unrestricted domain. As pay is always positive, the pay of any level cannot be less than 100 
percent  below  that  of  any  other  level.  Accordingly,  the  range  of  the  percentage  differences  ij P′  is 
restricted to  [ ] -100, ∞ , while that of  the  parity  ij π   is  [ ] , −∞ ∞ . This unrestricted domain  property  has 
statistical attractions including the avoidance of a tendency to a skewed distribution associated with the 
truncated lower limit of the percentage measure. 
3. The Pay Parity Matrix 
The whole remuneration schedule can be characterised by the 
2 n  parities  ij π  for i, j = 1,…,n.  
These can be conveniently arranged in the form of an  n n ×  matrix  Π , which we dub “the pay parity 
matrix”.
1  This matrix has the  ( )
th i, j  element  ( ) ij i j log P P π = , which is remuneration of  level  i  relative 
to  j.  As  i i 1 P P , i 1, ,n + > = … , by construction as we move from left to right along a given row of  , Π  the 
                                                  
1 In Clements and Izan (2008), we used the pay parity matrix to analyse the remuneration of Australian academic executives.  
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parities increase since we are comparing the pay of a given-level employee ( ) i P  with that of successively 
lower-paid employees -- the boss, number 2, number 3, and so on.   
To illustrate, we use remuneration data referring to what we call “academic-executives” at The 
University of Western Australia, given in column 2 of Table 1. As can be seen, the highest-earning 
employee (the Vice-Chancellor) receives $A485,000  p. a., while the next four levels  earn  $335,000, 
$305,000,  $295,000,  $275,000,  respectively.  The  second  last  element  of  column  2  shows  that  the 
arithmetic  mean  remuneration  is  $339,000,  while,  from  column  3,  the  geometric  mean  is 
( ) exp 12.7122 $332,000 ≈ . The corresponding pay parity matrix Π is of order 5 5 ×  and is given in rows 
1-5 and columns 4-8 of the table. Moving from left to right across the first row, we see that level 1 
receives about 37 percent more than level 2, 46 percent more than 3, 50 percent more than 4 and 57 
percent more than 5. The other elements of the table are discussed below when we introduce the various 
properties of  Π . 
  Let  i i p logP = , so that  ij i j p p π = − . We can then express the pay parity (PP) matrix in the form  
(1)                                                           ′ ′ = Π p p ι ι ι ι ι ι ι ι - , 
where  [ ] 1 n p , ,p ′ = p … is a vector of the  n  levels of remuneration (in logarithmic form), and  [ ] 1, ,1 ′ = … ι ι ι ι is 
a vector of  n  unit elements. Suppose we multiply the remuneration schedule by some positive constant 
λ, so that it becomes 
1 1 0 0
1 n 1 n P , ,P P , , P ′ ′     = λ λ     … … . For example, this  λ could be an adjustment for 
inflation, or an exchange rate that converts from one currency to another. Using a zero (one) superscript 
to  denote  the  old  (new)  remuneration  vector,  in  logarithmic  terms,  we  have 
[ ]
1 0 0
1 n logP , ,logP log , ,log ′ ′   = + λ λ   p … … , which can be expressed as  ( )
1 0 log = + λ p p ι ι ι ι . Definition (1) 
then implies that the new PP matrix 
1 Π  coincides with the old one 
0 Π  as 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 1 1 0 0 0 log log   ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ = = + λ + λ    
Π p p p p Π ι ι ι ιι ι ιι = ι ι ι ιι ι ιι = ι ι ι ιι ι ιι = ι ι ι ιι ι ιι = - - . 
In this case, the PP matrix is unchanged as it involves only relative comparisons. Thus we can say that Π 
is homogeneous of zero degree in the remuneration vector when expressed in terms of dollars,[ ] 1 n P, ,P … , 
or that Π is subject to additive degree of freedom. We record this as Property 1: 
Property 1 The pay parity matrix  Π  is invariant to multiplicative scaling of the 
remuneration schedule. 
Definition (1) also implies that  Π is a skew-symmetric matrix, that is, the diagonal elements are 
all zero, while  ij ji π = −π , i, j 1, ,n = … .  Thus: 
Property 2 The pay parity matrix  Π  is skew-symmetric.  
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This property is clear from the PP matrix of Table 1, where, for example, level 1 earns 37 percent more 
than level 2 [element (1,2) of the matrix], while 2 earns 37 percent less than 1 [element (2,1)]. This 
property represents an internal consistency of PP matrix comparisons. 
4. First and Second Moments 
Consider the 
th i  row of  Π,  [ ] i1 in , , π π … . One way in which the information contained in the 
whole row can be summarised in terms of one number i , , π is by the value that minimises the sum of 
squared deviations,  ( )
2
n
j 1 ij i = ∑ π −π . This leads to  i π  being the mean of the row, which we shall denote by 
( )
n
j 1 i ij 1 n = ∑ π = π , or  ( ) 1 n = Π π ι π ι π ι π ι  for the corresponding vector of  n  row means. The vector  π π π π  is a 
desirable centre-of-gravity measure of the whole Π matrix in a least-squares sense. Denoting (the log of 
geometric) mean remuneration by 







∑ ′ = p  = ι  = ι  = ι  = ι , 
it then follows from definition (1) that the row averages take the form  




′ ′ = , p - p p - π Π ι = ι ι ι = ι π Π ι = ι ι ι = ι π Π ι = ι ι ι = ι π Π ι = ι ι ι = ι  
where the last step is based on n ′ ι ι = ι ι = ι ι = ι ι = . The last member of equation (3) states that the averages of the 
rows of the PP matrix are just the deviations of each level of remuneration from the overall mean. That is, 
i i p p π = − , i=1, ,n … , where  i π  is the 
th i element of π π π π . Equation (3) can be expressed more compactly as  
(4)                                          
1
n ,  with   =  ′ = − M p M I π ιι π ιι π ιι π ιι , 
where M is a symmetric idempotent matrix  ( ) =
2 M M  of order  n n ×  that satisfies  = M 0 ι ι ι ι . As  M is 
symmetric,  ′ ′ = M 0 ι ι ι ι , which implies that  0. ′ ′ = Mp = ι π ι ι π ι ι π ι ι π ι  Thus, the sum over all levels of the deviations 
from the mean is zero.   
We summarise the above discussion as follows: 
Property 3 The average of the elements in the 
th i row of the pay parity matrix is the 
logarithmic deviation of remuneration at level  i  from the mean. 
Column 9 of Table 1 contains the row averages of the PP matrix, and shows that level 1 earns about 38 
percent more than the (geometric) mean, level 2 earns 1 percent more, and so on.  Interestingly, these row 
averages are close to the elements of column 2 of the PP matrix, which reflects the fact that in this 
example remuneration at level 2 is close to the mean.  The sum (and average) of these deviations from the 
mean is zero, as indicated by the second last entry of column 9.  
  As the PP matrix is a mapping of the remuneration vector p from 
n ￿  into 
2n ￿ , we can write it as 
the function  ( ) ′ ′ p = p - p Π = Π ι ι Π = Π ι ι Π = Π ι ι Π = Π ι ι . Interestingly, if we apply  ( ) i Π Π Π Π  to the vector of deviations from the  
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mean  π π π π ,  rather  than  p,  we  obtain  the  original  PP  matrix  associated  with  p.  That  is, 
( ) ( ) ′ ′ ′ ′ = = - p - p p Π π πι ιπ ι ι = Π Π π πι ιπ ι ι = Π Π π πι ιπ ι ι = Π Π π πι ιπ ι ι = Π ,which  follows  from  definition  (4)  and  is  a  type  of  self-reflective 
property. This result is a reflection of Property 1 whereby the PP matrix is invariant to multiplicative 
scaling of the remuneration schedule. When we express remuneration in terms of logarithmic deviations 
from  the  geometric  mean,  this  amounts  to  a  choice  of  units  for  remuneration  by  deflating  by  the 
geometric mean. More generally, if instead of the mean we subtract some  0 α >  from each element of p, 
so that the “scaled” remuneration vector is  α p- ι ι ι ι , then the associated PP matrix is  ( ) α p- Π ι Π ι Π ι Π ι , which is 
identical to the original matrix  ( ) p Π Π Π Π . 
  How  is  remuneration  of  the  organisation  dispersed  about  the  mean?  One  way  to  measure 
dispersion is by the variance of remuneration:  
(5)                               ( ) ( ) ( )
2 n n 2 2
i i
i 1 i 1
1 1 1 1
p p p p
n n n n = =
∑ ∑ ′ ′ σ = − = = π p- p- ι ι π π = ι ι π π = ι ι π π = ι ι π π = , 
where the third step follows from equation (3). Accordingly, 
Property 4 The variance of remuneration is the average of the sum of the squared 
row averages of the pay parity matrix. 
The last entry of column 3 of Table 1 shows that the logarithmic standard deviation of the remuneration 
schedule is 0.2002, or about 20 percent; thus the variance is ( )
2 0.2002 0.0401 = . Column 10 presents the 
squares of the row averages, and their mean of 
-2 4.01 10 × , given as the last element of the column, is 
identical to the above variance. 
  It is also to be noted that equations (4) and (5) imply that the variance can also be expressed as 
( )
2 1 n ′ ′ σ = p M Mp. But as  M  is idempotent, this simplifies to  
(6)                                                           
2 1
n
′ σ = p Mp. 
Next, consider the dispersion of the elements of the 
th i  row of the pay parity matrix about their centre of 
gravity, as well as their comovement with the elements of some other row. The following variance and 
covariance provide a convenient way to measure these concepts: 
         ( ) ( )( )
n n 2
ii ij i ik ij i kj k
j 1 j 1
1 1
,               
n n = =
∑ ∑ σ = π −π σ = π −π π −π . 
This  ii σ  is the variance of the 
th i  row of the PP matrix, while  ik σ  is the covariance between rows i and  k. 
The matrix  ′ − Π πι πι πι πι  is PP expressed as a deviation from the mean vector π π π π . The covariance matrix 
( )( )( ) 1 n ′ ′ ′ − − Π Π Ω = πι πι Ω = πι πι Ω = πι πι Ω = πι πι  contains on the diagonal the  n  row variances  11 nn , , σ σ …  and the cross-row 
covariances  ik  σ  as the off-diagonal elements. As  ( ) 1 n = Π π ι π ι π ι π ι , it follows that the above deviation 
matrix takes the form  
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1 1
n n
  ′ ′ ′ − = =    
Π Π Π Π ΠM πι − ιι = Ι − ιι πι − ιι = Ι − ιι πι − ιι = Ι − ιι πι − ιι = Ι − ιι , 
where  M is defined in equation (4). Thus as M is idempotent, the covariance matrix  Ω Ω Ω Ω becomes a 
multiple 1 n  of  
( )( )
( ) ( )
( )( )
2 n
′ ′ ′ ′ − − =
′ ′ ′ ′
′ ′ ′ ′ =
′ ′ =
′ σ
Π Π Π Π
p p M p p
p M p M p p
p Mp
πι πι Μ πι πι Μ πι πι Μ πι πι Μ
= ι −ι ι − ι = ι −ι ι − ι = ι −ι ι − ι = ι −ι ι − ι
ι −ι ι − ι ι −ι ι − ι ι −ι ι − ι ι −ι ι − ι
ι ι ι ι ι ι ι ι
= ιι . = ιι . = ιι . = ιι .
 
The fourth line of the above follows from   and  ′ ′ M = 0 M ι ι = 0 ι ι = 0 ι ι = 0 ι ι = 0 , while the fifth is based on equation (6).  
Thus we have 
2 ′ σ Ω = ιι Ω = ιι Ω = ιι Ω = ιι , so that  
(7)                                              
2
ii ik ,   i,k=1, ,n σ = σ = σ … . 
In words, each row of the PP matrix has a common variance 
2 σ , and each of the distinct   ( ) 1 2 n n 1 −      
covariances
2 also takes this value. In view of the skew-symmetric nature of Π (Property 2), each column 
of the matrix also has a common variance 
2 σ . The quantity 
2 σ  is the variance of the remuneration 
schedule defined in equation (5).  Accordingly, 
Property 5 The variance of each row and column of the PP matrix takes the same 
value, ,
2 σ  the variance of the remuneration schedule. Furthermore, each covariance 
between pairs of different rows (and columns) of this matrix is also equal to  .
2 σ  
As discussed above, the standard deviation of the UWA remuneration schedule is  0.2002 σ = . 
The last column of Table 1 contains the standard deviation (SD) of each row of  Π, and as can be seen, 
each value here is 
-2 20.02 10 × , the SD of the remuneration schedule. The same result applies to the SDs 
of the columns of Π, which are given as the last entries in columns 4-8 of Table 1.   
  The  average  sum  of  squares  of  the  PP  matrix  is  also  of  interest.  This  takes  the  form 
( ) ( ) ( )
2 2 2 n n
i 1 j 1 ij 1 n 1 n tr = = ∑ ∑ ′ π = ΠΠ ,  where  tr  denotes  the  trace  operator.  Defining 
( ) ( )
2 2 n
i 1 i 1 n p 1 n = ∑ ′ α = = p p  as average squared remuneration, in view of equation (1) we have  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )






2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2
1 n tr 1 n tr
1 n tr
1 n tr n np np n
1 n n n p n p n
2 p .
′ ′ ′ ′ ′ =
′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ =
′ ′ ′ ′ = α





ΠΠ p - p p -p
p p -p p - p p + p p
pp - p p +
ι ι ι ι ι ι ι ι ι ι ι ι ι ι ι ι
ι ι ι ι ι ι ι ι ι ι ι ι ι ι ι ι ι ι ι ι ι ι ι ι ι ι ι ι ι ι ι ι
ι − ι ιι ι − ι ιι ι − ι ιι ι − ι ιι  
                                                  
2 The correlation matrix corresponding to  Ω Ω Ω Ω  takes the form  ′ ιι ιι ιι ιι , so that each correlation is unity.  
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As  ( ) ( )
2 2 2 n
i 1 i p 1 n p -p = ∑ α − = = σ
2 , we finally obtain  
(8)                                                        
n n 2 2
ij 2




∑ ∑ π = σ . 
In  words,  the  average  sum  of  squares  of  the  elements  of  the  PP  matrix  is  twice  the  variance  of 
remuneration. 
Equation (1) implies that the mean of the 
2 n  elements of  Π is zero as, so the average sum of 
squares of the elements of Π is also the variance.
3 Result (8) then implies that the variance of Π is 
2 2 . σ  
The multiple 2 here derives from the nature of the Π matrix which involves all the bivariate comparisons 
( ) i, j , for i, j = 1,…,n. In particular, these 
2 n  comparisons include level  i  with level  j, as well as the 
reciprocal comparison of  j  with  i, so that the whole matrix contains  ij i j p p π = −  and  ji j i ij p p π = − = −π  
for i, j =1,…,n. Thus, when we square the elements of Π Π Π Π, the minus signs disappear and in essence each 
distinct pair ( ) i, j  is included twice in the average sum of squares ( )
2 2 n n
i 1 j 1 ij 1 n = = ∑ ∑ π .
4  We can summarise 
the above results as: 
Property 6 The elements of the PP matrix have a zero mean and a variance equal 
to 
2 2σ ,
2 σ being the variance of the remuneration schedule.  
The  bottom  of  Table  1  shows  that  the  average  sum  of  squares  of  the  elements  of  the  PP matrix  is 
8.01
2 10
− × , which is twice the variance of the remuneration schedule, 
2 -2 4.01 10 σ = × . 
5. The Gradient and Smoothness of the Remuneration Schedule 
The remuneration schedule, expressed in logarithmic form, ranked from the highest to the lowest, 
is  1 n p , ,p … . Suppose initially that it is not possible to skip any level when getting promoted. Thus, for 
example, an employee at the bottom of the hierarchy currently earning  n p  faces the prospect of getting 
promoted  to  level  n-1  and  receiving  n 1 p − .  Such  a  promotion  brings  a  pay  rise  of 
( ) n 1 n n 1 n n 1,n p p log P P − − − − = = π .  Similarly,  subsequent  promotions  yield  n 2,n 1 n 3,n 2 1,2 , ,..., − − − − π π π .  This 
means that we can read off from the pay parity matrix the entire set of pay increases, in relative terms, 
from the bottom to the top, as the consecutive parities  i 1,i − π , i n, ,2 = … , that is, the elements on the sub-
diagonal immediately to the right of the main diagonal, read from the bottom right-hand corner to the top 
                                                  
3 The term “variance of  Π ” is to be interpreted as meaning the variance of the 
2 n  elements of this matrix, vec Π . 
4  An  alternative  way  to  establish  result  (8)  is  as  follows:  Recall  the  covariance  matrix  introduced  below  equation  (6), 
( )( )( ) 1 n . ′ ′ ′ − − Π π Π π Ω = ι ι Ω = ι ι Ω = ι ι Ω = ι ι  This can be expressed as  ( )( ) 1 n   n ′ ′ − Π Π π π Ω = Ω = Ω = Ω = , so that  ( )   n ′ ′ = Π Π Ω+ π π . As 
2 ′ = σ Ω ιι Ω ιι Ω ιι Ω ιι , 
it follows that  






tr   n tr tr n n π
=
∑     ′ ′ ′ = σ = σ        
Π Π π π ιι + + ιι + + ιι + + ιι + + . 




i 1π n , = = σ ∑ the above becomes  ( )
2 2 tr   2n ′ = σ Π Π , from which result (8) follows directly.  
  8 
left. The quantities  i 1,i − π  are the logarithmic differences between remuneration at each level, or the sizes 
of the n-1 steps of the schedule. The average of these n-1 steps is the gradient of the entire remuneration 
schedule,  ( )
n
i 2 i 1,i 1 n 1 = − ∑ β = − π     . As  ( )
n n
i 2 i 2 i 1,i i 1 i 1 n p p p p = = − − ∑ ∑ π = − = − , the gradient takes the simple 
form 
(9)                                                    ( ) 1 n 1n p p





This shows that the gradient is just the overall “height” of the schedule,  1 n p p − , per unit of its “length”, 
the n-1 steps. 
Thus we have 
Property 7 The successive steps of the remuneration schedule are given by the 
elements along the sub-diagonal of the pay parity matrix  − − − n 1,n n 2,n 1 1,2 , ,..., π π π . The 
gradient of the entire schedule is the average of these steps. This average is a 
multiple  ( ) − 1 n 1  of the element of the PP matrix  π1n , which is the logarithmic 
ratio of the highest to lowest pay.  
Looking again at the example in Table 1, column 8, row 4 reveals that a promotion from level 5 to level 4 
generates about a 7-percent pay increase, while subsequent promotions yield increases of 3 percent, 9 
percent and 37 percent, respectively. The first element of column 8 is 
2
15 56.74 10
− π = × , so the gradient β 
defined in equation (9) is 
2 2 56.74 10 4 14.2 10
− − × = × , or about 14 percent. We present in Figure 2 a plot 
of the four steps of the schedule, as well as the gradient. 
The  sequence  of  pay  increases  associated  with  promotion  from  one  level  to  the  next  is 
i 1,i − π ,i n, ,2 = … . Define the variance of this sequence as  








∑ σ = π −β
−
. 
As the gradient is defined as  ( )
n
i 2 i 1,i 1 n 1 = − ∑ β = − π     , if we interpret the height of each step  i 1,i − π  as an 
independent “reading” on this gradient with a common variance 
2
∆ σ , then the sampling variance of the 
gradient is  









Property 8  The standard error of the gradient of the remuneration schedule is a 
multiple  − 1 n 1 of the standard deviation of the successive steps along the schedule 
− − − n 1,n n 2,n 1 1,2 , ,..., π π π .  
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Using the data in Table 1 to evaluate the variance in equation (10), yields  ( )
2 2 0.1335 ∆ σ = , so that the 
standard deviation is about 13.4 percent. Using this value in equation (11) together with n-1 = 4, gives a 
standard error of the gradient of   ( )
2 var 0.1335 4 0.0668 β = =  or about 6.7 percent. 
If the n-1 steps of the remuneration schedule are all of equal height -- that is, if the increase from 
one level to the next is identical for all levels -- then the schedule could be described as being “smooth”.  
In this case, each step size takes the identical value  β, so that  ( )
s
ij j i π = − β, i, j = 1,…,n, 
s
i 1,i − π =β, 
i 2, ,n = … , and  ( )
s s
i j p j i p = − β+ , i, j = 1,…,n, where the superscript  s  denotes the value under the 
hypothesis of “smoothness”. To allow for departures of the observed values of  i 1,i − π  from β, we write  
(12)                                          i 1,i i e              i 2, ,n − π =β+ = … , 
where  i e  is a zero-mean error term. Squaring both sides of this equation, summing over   i 2, ,n = … , and 
using 
n
i 2 i e 0 = ∑ = , yields  ( ) ( )
2 2 2 n
i 2 i 1,i n 1 n 1 = − ∆ ∑ π = − β + − σ , where 
2
∆ σ  is the variance defined in equation 
(10). This shows that the total sum of squares (TSS) of the steps can be decomposed into two nonnegative 
components, so that the fractions  








      and      
2
2







are, respectively, the proportion of the TSS explained by smoothness of the schedule, and the proportion 
that is not. The value of 
2 R  is a nonnegative fraction and is the squared correlation coefficient associated 
with regression (12).  Accordingly,  
Property 9 The value of 
2 R  defined in equation (13) is a measure of the extent to 
which the remuneration schedule is smooth. This 
2 R  is the share of the squared 
gradient in the sum of (i) the squared gradient and (ii) the variance of the successive 
steps along the schedule  − − − n 1,n n 2,n 1 1,2 , ,..., π π π . 
For  the  data  given  in  Table  1,  as  mentioned  above  the  gradient 
2 14.2 10
− β = × and 
( )
2 2 2 13.35 10
−










Accordingly, for this remuneration schedule, smoothness accounts for a little over one-half of the total 
sum of squares. 
We assumed above that it is not possible to skip any level when getting promoted. Now suppose 
this is no longer necessarily the case, so that it is possible to achieve “accelerated” promotion whereby  
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some levels of the schedule are skipped. The pay increase in moving  k > 0  steps up the remuneration 
schedule from level  i  to i-k  is  i k i i k,i p p − − − = π . This can be decomposed into  k  one-step moves as  
( ) ( ) ( ) i k i i k i k 1 i k 1 i k 2 i 1 i
i k,i k 1 i k 1,i k 2 i 1,i
p p p p p p p p
.
− − − − − − − − −
− − − − − − − −
− = − + − + + −




Thus we have 
Property  10  Using  the  PPP  matrix,  a  k-step  move  along  the  remuneration 
schedule is the sum of the corresponding  k  one-step moves. 
To illustrate this property in terms of Table 1, suppose someone moves from level four to level one. As 
2
14 49.72 10
− π = × , this 3-step promotion entails an approximate 50-percent pay increase, which is the sum 
of the corresponding three one-step moves,  34 23 21 3.33 9.38 37.00 49.71 π +π +π = + + =  (all 
2 10 )
− × . 
6. A Dummy-Variable Regression 
The above discussion deals with the pay parity matrix for an individual organisation. In this and 
the next section, we consider the problem of estimating a PP matrix with data from a sample of a number 
of organisations, and associated issues in hypothesis testing.   
Let  ic p  be the logarithm of the remuneration for level i ( ) i 1,...,n = in company (or other institution) 
c  (c 1,...,C) = . Define the dummy variable  jic d  as taking the value of 1 if j = i, 0 otherwise. Consider a 
regression of  ic p  on the n-1 dummies,  2ic nic d ,...,d : 
(14)                                             
n




∑ = α+ β +ε  
where  α is the intercept,  j β  is the coefficient on the 
th j  dummy and  ic ε  is a zero-mean independent 
disturbance term, with a constant variance 
2
ε σ . It is well known that the least-squares estimate of α,  ˆ α , is 
the geometric mean of the remuneration of level 1, the base level, while the estimate of  j β ,  j ˆ β , is the 
mean logarithmic difference between levels j and 1. For details, see the Appendix. 
  Suppose  we  have  values  for  the  first  column  of  the  pay  parity  matrix  11 21 31 n1 , , , ,..., Π π π π π .  
Given  that  the  ( )
th
i, j   element  of  Π   is  defined  as  ij i j p p π = − ,  it  follows  that  all  the  remaining  n-1 
columns of this matrix can be expressed in terms of the elements of the first.  That is,  
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(15)   
11 12 13 1n 1 2 1 3 1 n
21 22 23 2n 2 1 2 3 2 n
31 32 33 3n 3 1 3 2 3 n
n1 n2 n3 nn n 1 n 2 n 3
0 p p p p p p
p p 0 p p p p
   p p p p 0 p p
p p p p p p 0
                                         
π π π π − − −    
    π π π π − − −
    π π π π = − − −    
   




￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
… …
( )
( ) ( )
21 31 n1
21 21 31 21 n1
31 21 31 31 n1
n1 21 n1 31 n1
0
0










−π −π −π   
   π π −π π −π
  
π − π −π π −π   
  




￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
…
 
As the estimate of the coefficient  j β  in model (14),  j ˆ β , is the mean of  j 1 p p − , equation (15) 
demonstrates that we can estimate the elements of the first column of Π as  i1 i ˆ ˆ , π =β  i 2,...,n = ; those in 
the  first row as  1j j ˆ ˆ π = −β ,  j 2,...,n = ; and  the  remaining elements as  ij i j ˆ ˆ ˆ , i, j 2,...,n.   π =β −β =  These 
expressions can be combined as  
(16)                             ij i j 1 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ , i, j 1,...,n, with  0. π =β −β = β =  
Thus we have 
                        
2 3 n 11 12 13 1n
21 22 23 2n 2 2 3 2 n
31 32 33 3n 3 3 2 3 n
n1 n2 n3 nn
n n 2 n 3
ˆ ˆ ˆ 0 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ 0
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ 0
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ 0




￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
…
. 
  In the Appendix, we show that 
(17)                               
2 2
j
2 ˆ ˆ var  ,       var  , j = 2,...,n,
C C
ε ε σ σ
α = β =  
where 
2
ε σ  is the variance of the disturbance in model (14) and C is the number of companies. We also 
show that  
(18)                                 
2
ij
2 ˆ var          i, j = 1,...,n, i j.
C
ε σ
π = ≠  
Accordingly, the sampling variances of the estimates of all the (non-zero) elements of  Π are identical at 
2 2 ε σ /C.  This  is  clearly  restrictive  and  reflects  the  covariance  structure  of  model  (14),  whereby  it  is 
assumed that the disturbances have a constant variance across different levels of remuneration. In the next 
section we formulate a more general statistical model of the PP matrix with in a multivariate framework 
that relaxes these assumptions.
5 
                                                  
5 In the executive compensation literature, pay is usually found to be strongly related to the size of the organisation. The 
Appendix also shows that if we add to the right-hand side of model (14) a size variable, the least-squares estimators of the 
dummy-variable coefficients are unchanged.  
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7. A Multivariate Approach 
  Let  [ ] c 1c nc p ,...,p ′ = p  denote the vector of remuneration at institution c( ) c 1,...,C = . Define the mean 
vector and corresponding covariance matrix as 
(19)                        ( )( )
C C
c c c
c 1 c 1
1 1
, .
C C = =
∑ ∑ ′ = = − − p p p p p p Σ Σ Σ Σ  
If each remuneration vector is independent and has a common covariance matrix, the covariance matrix of 
the mean vector is  




= p  .  .  .  . Σ Σ Σ Σ  
  To illustrate, we use data on the remuneration of academic executives at 32 Australian universities 
presented in Table 2. Here, there are  n 5 =  levels of remuneration, and universities are ranked according to 
revenue (given in the last column of the table). Column 2 of Table 3 contains the mean vector (19) for the 
quartiles as well as for all 32 universities combined, while the covariance matrices Σ Σ Σ Σ are given in columns 5-
9. The standard errors of the means, contained in column 3, are the square roots of the diagonal elements of 
covariance matrix (20). The diagonal elements of columns 5-9 reveal that the variances differ substantially 
across different levels. For example, in the first quartile, the variance of remuneration of level 1 (which refers 
to the Vice-Chancellor) is 7.52, while that of level 3 is 2.91 (both  × 100). These variances also differ 
appreciably across different groups of universities; a stark contrast is between the variance of level 1 in the 
first quartile, 7.52, and that of the same level in the third quartile, 2.59 (× 100). It is also to be noted that 
within a group, remuneration is quite highly correlated across different levels, especially among levels 2-5 
(see columns 10-14 of Table 3). These patterns all point to the restrictive assumptions of the dummy-variable 
approach, discussed above, as being unlikely to be satisfied in practice. 
  The  n n ×  pay parity (PP) matrix takes the form  ′ ′ = − pι ιp Π Π Π Π ,which we shall estimate by using the 
mean vector p: 
(21)        ˆ . ′ ′ = p - p Π ι ι Π ι ι Π ι ι Π ι ι  
Table 4 contains in columns 2-6 the estimated PP matrices. Thus, according to the first row for the first 
quartile, the VC earns about 50 percent more than the number two academic executive on average, 62 percent 
more  than  number  three,  75  percent  more  than  number  four  and  79  percent  more  than  number  five. 
According to the standard errors (to be discussed further below), all these differences are highly significant.  
Many of the individual elements of the PP matrices differ across groups of universities; below we consider 
whether or not these differences are statistically significant. Finally, denoting the  ( )
th i, j  element of  ˆ Π Π Π Π by 
ij ˆ π , column 7 of Table 4 contains the row averages of the PP matrix,  ( )
5
j 1 i ij 1 5 ˆ ˆ , = ∑ π = π  which are interpreted 
as the differences between the respective remuneration levels and the mean. Thus, for the first quartile, VCs  
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earn about 53 percent more than the group average, while remuneration of the lower levels is 3, -9, -21 and  
-26 percent away from average. These differences are mostly statistically significant. 
  The standard errors of the estimated PP matrices are obtained as follows. From equation (21), the 
th i  
column of  ˆ Π Π Π Π is  i i ˆ -p , = π p ι  where  i p  is the 
th i  element of  . p  Define  i ι  as the n-vector with 
th i  element one 
and zeros elsewhere, so that  i i p ′ = ι p,  i i p ′ ′ = = i ι ι pι ιι p and  ( ) i i ˆ ′ = − π Ι ιι p, where  Ι  is the identity matrix.  
Thus, we can write 
(22)                                                          i i ˆ , = π Α p  
where  i i′ = − Α Ι ιι  is an  n n     ×  matrix. Equation (22) then implies that  i i i ˆ var var  π Α p Α′ =  or in view of 
equation (20), 
(23)                                             i i
1 ˆ var .
C
′ = i π Α Α Σ Σ Σ Σ  
  We  illustrate  the  workings  of  equation  (23)  first  with  the  data  pertaining  to  the  first  quartile 
universities. Columns 4-8 of Panel A of Table 5 contain the upper triangle of covariance matrix (23) for the 
first column of the PP matrix, that is, for i = 1. The square roots of the diagonal elements of this matrix are 
the standard errors of the elements of  i ˆ , π  which are contained in column 3 of Table 5. For convenience, the 
point estimate of  i ˆ π  is reproduced (from Table 4) in column 2 of Table 5. The subsequent panels of Table 5 
contain the corresponding measures for the remaining columns of  ˆ Π Π Π Π. Taken as a whole, columns 2 and 3 of 
Table 5 are a vectorised version of the point estimates of the PP matrix and the standard errors contained in 
Panel A of Table 4. The standard errors of  ˆ Π Π Π Π for the other groups of universities in Table 4 are computed in 
exactly the same manner. 
  Write  the  n 1 ×    vector  of  row  averages  of  the  PP  matrix  as  ( ) ˆ ˆ 1 5 = π πι  
( )( ) 1 5 ′ ′ = − pι ιp ι ( ) 1 5 , ′ = − p ιι p  or  
(23)                                                           ˆ = π Μp , 
where  ( ) - 1 5 . ′ Μ = Ι ιι  Thus from equation (20), 
(25)                                                  
1 ˆ var
C
′ = π Μ Μ Σ Σ Σ Σ . 
Columns 4-8 of Table 6 contain covariance matrix (25) for the first quartile, column 3 the corresponding 
standard errors (the square roots of the diagonal elements of the covariance matrix) and column 2 the point 
estimates of the row averages (reproduced from column 7 of Table 4). 
  Among the four groups of universities, we can test for differences in the pay parity matrices. Going 
back to Table 4, the parity between levels 2 and 4 is  24 ˆ 24.85 π =  for the first quartile, with standard error 
4.51  (both  100   × ).  For  the  second  quartile,  24 ˆ 10.28 π =   with  standard  error  3.39.  The  between-quartile 
difference 24.85 – 10.28 = 14.56 is given as element (2, 4) of the matrix on the left of Panel A of Table 7.   
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Under independence, the standard error of this difference is 
2 2 4.51 3.39 5.65 ( 100)   + = × , as shown in the 
corresponding element of the middle matrix of Panel A of Table 7, while the t-value of  14.56/5.65 = 2.58 is 
given as element (2, 4) of the matrix on the right of the panel.  This difference is significant at conventional 
levels. The other differences in the PPs are similarly interpreted. 
8. Concluding Comments  
  In this paper, we introduced a new tool -- the pay parity (PP) matrix -- for measuring relative pay 
within  organisations  and  demonstrated  its  advantages  and  useful  properties.  We  established  how  the 
whole remuneration schedule can be conveniently characterised with the PP matrix and illustrated its 
application by using data on the remuneration of academic executives. 
Important  dimensions  of  the  pay  schedule  are  their  average  gradient  and  smoothness.  These 
describe how remuneration increases as we move to higher levels in the organisation -- the steeper the 
gradient, the larger the increment in remuneration. In relatively flat organisational structures, we would 
expect the schedule to be reasonably smooth and the gradient to be modest, so that there would be little 
differentiation across various levels. In other types of organisations there could be large jumps in pay, in 
going from the second to the top job for example, so the remuneration schedule would be steeper and 
rougher.  The  pay  parity  matrix  allows  us  to  conveniently  measure,  and  draw  inferences  about,  the 
gradient and the degree of smoothness. 
Among  the  several  other  possible  applications  of  the  pay  parity  matrix,  the  measurement  of 
income inequality is worth singling out. The income of each individual in a country could be compared 
with that of all others by using a type of parity matrix, but the large dimension of the matrix would be 
unwieldy. To keep things manageable, suppose individuals are grouped according to income such as 
quintiles, so that PP matrix is dimensioned 5 5 × . As it can be shown that the PP matrix is consistent in 
aggregation, the  5 5 ×  matrix and the associated dispersion measures contain much of the population 
information. For example, the logarithmic variance of income over the whole population is the sum of 
two unique, nonnegative components, (i) a weighted average of the corresponding group variances, and 
(ii) a weighted between-group variance.  
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APPENDIX 
   
We consider the nature of the least-squares estimates of model (14), reproduced here: 
(A1)         
n
ic j jic ic
j 2
p d ,   i = 1,...,n levels,   c = 1,...,C companies.
=
∑ = α+ β +ε  
Denote the total number of observations  n C ×  by M. Define the  M 1 ×  column vector of remuneration 











p 1 0 . . . 0
. . 1 .
. . . .
. . . .
p 1 0 . . . 1
p 1 0 . . . 0
. . 1 .
. . . .
. . . .
, 
p 1 0 . . . 1
. . . .
. . . .
. . . .
p 1 0 . . . 0
. . 1 .
. . . .
. . . .
p 1 0 . . . 1
y =   X
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   













































   
 
Note that the X matrix comprises exclusively zeros and ones, which we write as  [ ] 2 n X =  ι d d … , 
where  ι  is a column vector of M elements and  j d  is an M-vector of observations on the j
th  dummy 
variable. Note also that the inner product of each vector of dummies is equal to the number of companies 
in the sample and that these vectors are pairwise orthogonal: 
                                             j ′ d j d  = C,         j = 2,…,n,        j ′ d k d = 0,       j≠ k. 
    Using the above notation, model (A1) can be written for i = 1,…,n and c  = 1,…,C in vector 
format  as  = y Xθ ε + ,  where  [ ] 2 n
′ = α β β … θ θ θ θ   is  a  vector  of  n  coefficients  and  ε  is  a  vector  of 
disturbances. The least-squares (LS) estimator of θ is ( )








































2    .    .    .    n 
n -1 dummies 
 for level  
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where ι  is a vector of n-1 unit elements and I is an identity matrix of order n-1. The inverse of this matrix 
is 
(A2)                                        ( )
1 1 1
     
C
− ′ −  





The cross-product vector takes the form 











  ′ =  
 





i 1 c 1 ic p p = = •• = ∑ ∑ and 
C
c 1 j jc p p = • = ∑ . 









ˆ p p p
ˆ 1 p 1 1 ˆ p           =      .
C C p p
ˆ p p
ι











  α   −  








p p p p p p , •• • •• •• • •
=
∑ − = − − =  
we have 
(A4)                               ( ) 1 j j 1
1 1 ˆ ˆ  p  ,        p p  ,    j = 2,...,n
C C
• • • α = β = − . 
In words, the LS estimator of the intercept of model (A1) is the geometric mean of remuneration of level 
1. The coefficient of the j
th  dummy is the mean of the difference between the remuneration of level  j  
and that of level 1. 
  As the covariance matrix of the LS estimator is  ( )
1 2 −
ε ′ σ X X , where 
2
ε σ  is the variance of  ic ε , the 
disturbance term in model (A1), it follows from equation (A2) that  
(A5)                             
2 2
j
2 ˆ ˆ var  ,         var  ,   j = 2,...,n.
C C
ε ε σ σ
α = β =  
In words, the variances of each of the n-1 coefficients of the dummies take the same value, and this value 
is twice that of the variance of the intercept. Equation (A5) is equation (17) of the text. 
  Equation (16) of the text shows that the estimate of the (i, j)
th  element of the pay parity matrix is 
the difference between the i
th  and j
th  dummy coefficients:  
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(A6)                                       ij i j 1 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ,   i, j = 1,...,n, with  0. π =β −β β =  
To derive the corresponding variance, define an n-vector that has the value one as element  i+1  and 
minus one as element  j+1: 
                                     [ ] 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 ′ = − z … … … , 
 
which satisfies 
(A7)                                           0,            2. ι z z z ′ ′ = =  
As  ij ˆ ˆ z θ, ′ π =   ( )
-1 2
ij ˆ ˆ var   var  ε ′ ′ ′ π = σ z θ z = z XX z . It then follows from equation (A2) that  




ˆ var  .
C
ι
 z    z ι I ιι
ε




    Define the vector z∗ as z with the first zero omitted, so that  0 z z∗ ′   ′ =
 
. Constraints (A7) imply 
that this vector also satisfies 
(A9)                                         0,          2. ∗ ∗ ∗ ′ ′ = = ι z z z  




∗ ∗ ′ −   ′ ′ ′ + =   ′ − +  
ι
z  z = z I ιι z ι I ιι  
where the last step is based on constraints (A9). This means that  
(A10)                               
2
ij
2 ˆ var  ,     i, j = 1,...,n,    i j.
C
ε σ
π = ≠  
In words, the sampling variance of each (non-zero) element of the pay parity matrix takes the same value, 
2 2 ε σ /C.  This  value  is  the  same  as  the  variance  of  the  dummy  coefficients  given  in  equation  (A5).  
Equation (A10) is equation (18) of the text. 
    Another way to derive result (A10) is as follows. As the LS covariance matrix is  ( )
-1 2 , ε ′ σ X X  from 
equation (A2) the covariance matrix of the dummy coefficients is 





ε σ ′ +  
so that  
(A12)                                             ( )
2
i j ˆ ˆ cov ,  .
C
ε σ
β β =    
From equations (A6), (A5) and (A12), 
( )
2 2 2 2
ij i j i j
2 2 2 2 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ var var var 2cov , ,
C C C C
ε ε ε ε σ σ σ σ
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which is the same as result (A10). Note finally that another feature of the pattern of covariance matrix 
(A11) is that the implied correlation matrix takes the form  ( )( ) 1 2 , ′ + I ιι so that the estimates of the 
dummy variable coefficients are equicorrelated with correlation one-half. 
  As prior research has established that executive remuneration systematically increases with the 
size of the organisation (Murphy, 1999, Soh, 2006), there may be reason to believe that the pay parity 
matrix  is  also  related  to  size.  If  we  measure  size  by  revenue,  a  simple  approach  to  investigate  this 
possibility would be to add the logarithm of total revenue,  c r , to the right-hand side of model (A1): 
(A13)       
n




∑ = δ+γ + φ +µ , 
where  γ is the elasticity of remuneration with respect to size, δ and  j φ  are new coefficients and  ic µ  is a 
disturbance  term.  While  the  value  of  the  size  elasticity  in  (A13),  γ,  is  of  considerable  interest,  the 
sensitivity of remuneration to size is identical for all levels of pay. Accordingly, model (A13) yields 
exactly the same estimates of the dummy variable coefficients as does (A1); that is to say, the two models 
imply the same pay parity matrix. We now prove this invariance result. 
   Proceeding as before, the only difference is that there is now a new second column of X for 
revenue. If we write  n ι ι ι ι  for a column vector of n unit elements, this second column can be expressed as  
[ ]
[ ]
1 1 2 2 C C
1 n 2 n C n
r r r r r r
r r r
′
′ ′ ′ ′
… … … …
￿ ι ι ι ι ι ι ι ι ι ι ι ι
 
where  r  =  [ ] 1 c r ,...,r ′  and  ⊗  is  the  Kronecker  product.  Thus,  X    can  be  written  as  X  = 
[ ] M n 2 n r d d ⊗ … ι ι ι ι ι ι ι ι ,  where,  as  before,  j d   is  an  M-vector  of  observations  on  the 
th j   dummy 
variable. Using the above notation, model (A13) can be written for  i = 1,…,n  and  c = 1,…,C  in vector 
format as  = + y Xθ µ, where θ = [δ γ  2 φ  …  n φ ] ′ and µ is a vector of disturbances.   
    The least-squares estimator of  θ is 
1 ( )
− ′ ′ X X X y. Defining r = 
C
c 1 c r = ∑  as total revenue of all  C  
companies, and 
2 s = 
2 C
c 1 c r = ∑  as the sum of squared revenue, the moment matrix takes the form 












′    






ι ι ι ι
ι ι ι ι
ι ι ι ι ι ι ι ι
, 
where  n 1 − I  is an identity matrix of order (n - 1). The inverse of this moment matrix is 
 
n ⊗ r ι ι ι ι ,  =  =  
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n-1 n 1 n 1 n 1 n 1
1 n 1












− − − −
 −    ′ − − −    
    ∆ ′ −    
  ′ =  
  ′ − +  
 
   
ι ι ι ι
ι ι ι ι ι ι ι ι ι ι ι ι
, 
where  ( )
2 2 2 C ns r n 1 C r   ∆ = − − −    and  n 1 − 0  is an n-1 vector of zeros. The cross-product vector takes 
the form 




























i 1 c 1 ic p p , = = •• = ∑ ∑  
n
i 1 c ic p p = • = ∑  and 
C
c 1 j jc p p = • = ∑ . 



























This shows that the 








∑ φ = − + + . 
As 
n
k 2 k p = • ∑ = 
C
c 1 1c p p = •• ∑ − =  1 p p •• • − , the above simplifies to  




• • − . 
In words, the coefficient of the 
th j  dummy is the mean of the difference between the remuneration of 
level  j  and that of level 1; or the mean of level  j  relative to the mean of level 1. This is identical to the 
LS estimator of the corresponding dummy variable coefficient  j β  in model (A1), given in equation (A4).  









0 I − − − − −
  ′ − +    








  φ  
￿   =  
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FIGURE 1 
THREE MEASURES OF RELATIVE PAY 
  













REMUNERATION SCHEDULE AND PAY PARITY MATRIX, 
ACADEMIC EXECUTIVES, THE UNIVERSITY OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA, 2005 
 
      Remuneration 
 
Pay parity matrix Π Π Π Π  
(Level j)    
Summary of PP matrix rows 
Logs     
Level i 
Dollars 





(1)  (2)  (3)    (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)    (9)  (10)  (11) 
                         
1  485  13.0919                37.97  14.42  20.02 
2  335  12.7219                0.97  0.01  20.02 
3  305  12.6281                -8.42  0.71  20.02 
4  295  12.5947                -11.75  1.38  20.02 
5  275  12.5245                -18.77  3.52  20.02 
                         
Mean  339  12.7122    -37.97  -0.97  8.42  11.75  18.77    0.00  4.01  20.02 
SD  75.52  0.2002    20.02  20.02  20.02  20.02  20.02    20.02     
                                      
                         
       
Average sum of squares 
( )
5 5 2 2 1
ij
i 1 j 1
1 5 0.80 10
−
= =
× ∑ ∑ π =  
       
                         
                         
 
Notes: 1. All entries in column 4-11 are to be divided by 100.  
 2. SD = standard deviation, defined as the square root of the mean squared deviation of n values 
1 n x , , x … from the mean  x , 
( ) ( )
2 n
i 1 i 1 n x x = ∑ − .  
   Source:  The remuneration data of column 2 refer to academic-executives of the University of Western Australia. These data are from the 
University’s Annual Report, 2005, available at http://year2005.annualreport.publishing.uwa.edu.au/welcome.   
.  . 
. 








Pay ratio ij R  






( ) ij ij P =100 R -1 ′ ×  
0.00 37.00 46.38 49.72 56.74
37.00 0.00 9.38 12.72 19.74
46.38 9.38 0.00 3.33 10.35
49.72 12.72 3.33 0.00 7.02
56.74 19.74 10.35 7.02 0.00
 
  −  
  − −
 
− − −  
  − − − −   
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FIGURE 2 
 
STEPS AND GRADIENT OF THE REMUNERATION SCHEDULE, 
ACADEMIC EXECUTIVES, THE UNIVERSITY OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA, 2005 
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i 1,i 100   − π ×  
Step i i 1   → −   
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TABLE 2 
 
ACADEMIC EXECUTIVE REMUNERATION AND REVENUE, 
AUSTRALIAN UNIVERSITIES, 2005 
 Remuneration at level ($’000) 
University 
1  2  3  4  5 
Revenue 
($’m)
A. First Quartile 
1. USC  335  185  175  165  165                51 
2. SCU  375  285  225  225  215              110 
3. Canberra  435  335  295  245  235              123 
4. Ballarat  325  215  205  195  195              133 
5. SQ  345  305  215  195  175              153 
6. Murdoch  405  265  235  235  215              196 
7. JCU  345  235  235  185  185              214 
8. ECU  795  175  165  115  105              217 
           
Means  420  250  219  195  186  150
             
B. Second Quartile 
9. Wollongong  465  315  235  235  235              273 
10. Swinburne  255  205  205  195  195              275 
11. CQ  485  235  225  215  195              276 
12. Tasmania  365  225  215  215  185              286 
13. CSU  325  245  245  225  195              294 
14. Victoria  475  305  305  295  275              328 
15. Newcastle  445  345  345  275  215              339 
16. Western Sydney  515  285  285  285  215              356 
             
Means  416  270  258  243  214  303
             
C. Third Quartile 
17. SA  465  295  265  255  235              375 
18. LaTrobe  415  365  305  295  295              384 
19. Macquarie  435  295  285  285  285              391 
20. UTS  515  415  315  295  255              412 
21. Griffith  335  315  305  295  245              432 
22. Deakin  515  355  295  275  265              436 
23. Curtin  475  215  175  165  165              442 
24. Adelaide  595  425  285  265  255              477 
             
Means  469  335  279  266  250  419
             
D. Fourth Quartile 
25. UWA  485  335  305  295  275              509 
26. RMIT  435  375  315  315  255              591 
27. ANU  558  303  288  288  258              608 
28. NSW  605  385  245  225  215              775 
29. Queensland  955  525  395  365  345              913 
30. Sydney  575  485  375  365  345           1,022 
31.  Monash  615  575  565  465  455           1,041 
32.  Melbourne  855  605  605  525  265           1,212 
             
Means   635  448  387  355  302  834
           
Grand Mean  485  326  285  265  238  426
                    
    Source: 2005 Annual Reports of Universities. 
  24 
TABLE 3 
ACADEMIC EXECUTIVE REMUNERATION, 
MEANS, COVARIANCES AND CORRELATIONS, 
AUSTRALIAN UNIVERSITIES, 2005 
 
  Geometric Mean    Covariance matrix × 100 
(Level) 
  Correlation matrix 
(Level) 
Level  Logarithmic  Standard 
Error 
Dollars 
(‘000)    1  2  3  4  5    1  2  3  4  5 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)    (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)    (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14) 
A. First Quartile 
1  5.9962  0.0969  402    7.516  -2.035  -1.550  -3.902  -4.482    1.000  -0.338  -0.331  -0.627  -0.697 
2  5.4978  0.0776  244      4.822  3.279  4.173  3.907      1.000  0.876  0.837  0.759 
3  5.3733  0.0603  216        2.908  3.316  3.340        1.000  0.857  0.836 
4  5.2493  0.0803  190          5.155  5.237          1.000  0.984 
5  5.2024  0.0829  182            5.495            1.000 
B. Second Quartile 
1  6.0071  0.0807  406    5.210  2.749  2.219  2.325  1.457    1.000  0.699  0.566  0.714  0.525 
2  5.5836  0.0609  266      2.971  2.515  2.042  1.493      1.000  0.849  0.831  0.713 
3  5.5359  0.0608  254        2.953  2.242  1.241        1.000  0.915  0.594 
4  5.4808  0.0504  240          2.032  1.285          1.000  0.741 
5  5.3571  0.0430  212            1.478            1.000 
C. Third Quartile 
1  6.1375  0.0568  463    2.585  1.190  -0.349  -0.599  -0.217    1.000  0.358  -0.122  -0.204  -0.081 
2  5.7937  0.0732  328      4.283  3.059  2.898  2.514      1.000  0.831  0.767  0.726 
3  5.6162  0.0629  275        3.163  3.219  2.716        1.000  0.992  0.912 
4  5.5696  0.0645  262          3.329  2.845          1.000  0.931 
5  5.5086  0.0592  247            2.804            1.000 
D. Fourth Quartile 
1  6.4222  0.0877  615    6.160  4.184  4.033  3.158  1.355    1.000  0.696  0.541  0.499  0.247 
2  6.0769  0.0857  436      5.872  6.368  5.131  3.239      1.000  0.875  0.831  0.603 
3  5.9106  0.1062  369        9.017  7.544  4.299        1.000  0.986  0.647 
4  5.8405  0.0901  344          6.497  3.569          1.000  0.632 
5  5.6836  0.0783  294            4.905            1.000 
E. All 
1  6.1408  0.0510  464    8.318  5.286  4.306  3.606  2.373    1.000  0.595  0.518  0.423  0.314 
2  5.7380  0.0544  310      9.475  8.068  8.123  6.695      1.000  0.909  0.893  0.831 
3  5.6090  0.0510  273        8.308  8.173  6.300        1.000  0.960  0.835 
4  5.5350  0.0522  253          8.731  6.964          1.000  0.900 






PAY PARITY MATRICES, 
ACADEMIC EXECUTIVES, AUSTRALIAN UNIVERSITIES, 2005 
(Standard errors in parentheses) 
 
  Levels       
Row  Level 
  1  2  3  4  5 
  Average 
(1)    (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)    (7) 
  
A. First Quartile 
1               0.00   49.84  (14.32)   62.29  (13.00)  74.69  (16.00)  79.38  (16.57)       53.24  (11.85) 
2    -49.84  (14.32)            0.00   12.44  (3.83)  24.85  (4.51)  29.54  (5.59)       3.40  (3.71) 
3    -62.29  (13.00)  -12.44  (3.83)             0.00  12.41  (4.23)  17.10  (4.64)      -9.05   (2.03) 
4    -74.69  (16.00)  -24.85  (4.51)  -12.41  (4.23)            0.00    4.70  (1.48)    -21.45   (4.33) 
5    -79.38  (16.57)  -29.54  (5.59)  -17.10  (4.64)   -4.70  (1.48)              0.00    -26.14   (5.04) 
 
B. Second Quartile 
1               0.00   42.35  (5.79)   47.12  (6.82)   52.63  (5.69)  65.00  (6.87)     41.42  (4.71) 
2    -42.35  (5.79)              0.00     4.77  (3.34)   10.28  (3.39)  22.65  (4.28)      -0.93  (2.28) 
3    -47.12  (6.82)    -4.77  (3.34)               0.00     5.51  (2.50)  17.87  (4.94)      -5.70  (2.82) 
4    -52.63  (5.69)  -10.28  (3.39)    -5.51  (2.50)             0.00  12.37  (3.43)    -11.21  (1.63) 
5    -65.00  (6.87)  -22.65  (4.28)  -17.87  (4.94)  -12.37  (3.43)  0.00    -23.58  (3.25) 
 
C. Third Quartile 
1                0.00   34.38  (7.49)   52.13  (8.98)  56.79  (9.43)  62.89  (8.53)     41.24  (6.68) 
2    -34.38  (7.49)              0.00   17.75  (4.08)  22.41  (4.77)  28.51  (5.07)       6.86  (3.03) 
3    -52.13  (8.98)  -17.75  (4.08)              0.00    4.66  (0.82)  10.76  (2.59)    -10.89  (2.42) 
4    -56.79  (9.43)  -22.41  (4.77)    -4.66  (0.82)              0.00    6.11  (2.35)    -15.55  (2.92) 
5    -62.89  (8.53)  -28.51  (5.07)  -10.76  (2.59)   -6.11  (2.35)             0.00    -21.66  (2.66) 









TABLE 4 (Continued) 
PAY PARITY MATRICES, 
ACADEMIC EXECUTIVES, AUSTRALIAN UNIVERSITIES, 2005 
(Standard errors in parentheses) 
 
  Levels     
Row  Level 
  1  2  3  4  5 
  Average 





D. Fourth Quartile 
1                0.00   34.53  (6.77)   51.16  (9.43)   58.18  (8.90)  73.86  (10.22)     43.55  (6.45) 
2    -34.53   ( 6.77)             0.00   16.63  (5.19)   23.64  (5.13)  39.33   (7.33)       9.01  (2.92) 
3    -51.16  (9.43)  -16.63  (5.19)              0.00     7.01  (2.31)  22.70  (8.16)       -7.61  (3.94) 
4    -58.18  (8.90)  -23.64  (5.13)    -7.01  (2.31)              0.00  15.69  (7.30)    -14.63  (3.29) 
5    -73.86  (10.22)  -39.33  (7.33)  -22.70  (8.16)  -15.69  (7.30)            0.00    -30.32  (5.79) 
                   
E. All   
1                  0.00   40.28  (4.75)   53.17  (5.00)  60.57  (5.54)           70.28  (5.71)   44.86  (4.04) 
2    -40.28  (4.75)             0.00   12.90  (2.27)  20.29  (2.48)           30.01  (3.03)     4.58  (1.65) 
3    -53.17  (5.00)  -12.90  (2.27)             0.00    7.40  (1.47)          17.11  (2.83)    -8.31  (1.48) 
4    -60.57  (5.54)  -20.29  (2.48)    -7.40  (1.47)              0.00            9.71  (2.28)  -15.71  (1.72) 
5    -70.28  (5.71)  -30.01  (3.03)  -17.11  (2.83)  -9.71  (2.28)            0.00    -25.42  (2.26)  





COLUMNS OF PAY PARITY MATRIX AND COVARIANCE MATRICES, 
ACADEMIC EXECUTIVES, AUSTRALIAN UNIVERSITIES, 2005, 
FIRST QUARTILE 
 
    Column of Π  matrix    Covariance matrix 
(Level) 
Level    Point 
estimate 
Standard 
error    1  2  3  4  5 
(1)    (2)  (3)    (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
A. Column 1 
1    0.000  0.000    0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
2    -49.844  14.322      2.051  1.798  2.203  2.243 
3    -62.286  13.001        1.690  2.036  2.111 
4    -74.692  15.998          2.560  2.642 
5    -79.383  16.574            2.747 
                   
B. Column 2 
1    49.844  14.322    2.051  0.000  0.254  -0.152  -0.191 
2    0.000  0.000      0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
3    -12.443  3.827        0.146  0.086  0.122 
4    -24.848  4.515          0.204  0.247 
5    -29.539  5.593            0.313 
                   
C. Column 3 
1    62.286  13.001    1.690  -0.107  0.000  -0.345  -0.421 
2    12.443  3.827      0.146  0.000  0.061  0.024 
3    0.000  0.000        0.000  0.000  0.000 
4    -12.406  4.228          0.179  0.186 
5    -17.096  4.639            0.215 
                   
D. Column 4 
1    74.692  15.998    2.560  0.356  0.524  0.000  -0.083 
2    24.848  4.515      0.204  0.118  0.000  -0.043 
3    12.406  4.228        0.179  0.000  -0.007 
4    0.000  0.000          0.000  0.000 
5    -4.691  1.484            0.022 
                   
E. Column 5 
1    79.383  16.574    2.747  0.504  0.636  0.105  0.000 
2    29.539  5.593      0.313  0.191  0.066  0.000 
3    17.096  4.639        0.215  0.029  0.000 
4    4.691  1.484          0.022  0.000 
5    0.000  0.000            0.000 
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TABLE 6 
 
DEVIATIONS FROM MEAN REMUNERATION AND COVARIANCE 
MATRIX, ACADEMIC EXECUTIVES, AUSTRALIAN UNIVERSITIES, 
2005, FIRST QUARTILE 
 
    Deviation from mean    Covariance matrix 
(Level) 
Level    Point 
estimate 
Standard 
error    1  2  3  4  5 
(1)    (2)  (3)    (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
1    53.241  11.851    1.405  -0.254  -0.122  -0.484  -0.544 
2    3.397  3.712      0.138  0.016  0.061  0.040 
3    -9.045  2.027        0.041  0.025  0.040 
4    -21.451  4.333          0.188  0.210 
5    -26.142  5.043            0.254 
 
    Note: All entries are to be divided by 100.  
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TABLE  7 
DIFFERENCES IN PAY PARITY MATRICES, 
ACADEMIC EXECUTIVES, AUSTRALIAN UNIVERSITIES, 2005 
 Differences    Standard errors of differences    t-statistics  
 
A. First vs Second Quartiles 
0.00  7.50  15.16  22.06  14.39    0.00  15.44  14.68  16.98  17.94    -  0.49  1.03  1.30  0.80 
  0.00  7.67  14.56  6.89      0.00  5.08  5.65  7.04      -  1.51  2.58  0.98 
    0.00  6.90  -0.78        0.00  4.91  6.77        -  1.40  -0.11 
      0.00  -7.67          0.00  3.73          -  -2.05 
        0.00            0.00            - 
 
B. First vs Third Quartiles 
0.00  15.46  10.16  17.91  16.49    0.00  16.16  15.80  18.57  18.64    -  0.96  0.64  0.96  0.88 
  0.00  -5.31  2.44  1.03      0.00  5.59  6.56  7.55      -  -0.95  0.37  0.14 
    0.00  7.75  6.33        0.00  4.31  5.31        -  1.80  1.19 
      0.00  -1.42          0.00  2.78          -  -0.51 
        0.00            0.00            - 
 
C. First vs Fourth Quartiles 
0.00  15.31  11.13  16.52  5.52    0.00  15.84  16.0599  18.31  19.47    -  0.97  0.69  0.90  0.28 
  0.00  -4.19  1.21  -9.79      0.00  6.4472  6.84  9.22      -  -0.65  0.18  -1.06 
    0.00  5.39  -5.61        0.00  4.82  9.38        -  1.12  -0.60 
      0.00  -10.99          0.00  7.45          -  -1.48 
        0.00            0.00            - 
                                 
 
 
(Continued on next page)  
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TABLE  7 (Continued) 
TESTS OF DIFFERENCES IN PAY PARITY MATRICES, 
ACADEMIC EXECUTIVES, AUSTRALIAN UNIVERSITIES, 2005 
 Differences    Standard errors of differences    t-statistics  
 
 
D. Second vs Third Quartiles 
0.00  7.97  -5.01  -4.15  2.10    0.00  9.47  11.26  11.01  10.95    -  0.84  -0.44  -0.38  0.19 
  0.00  -12.97  -12.12  -5.86      0.00  5.27  5.85  6.63      -  -2.46  -2.07  -0.88 
    0.00  0.85  7.11        0.00  2.63  5.57        -  0.32  1.28 
      0.00  6.26          0.00  4.16          -  1.51 
        0.00            0.00            - 
                                 
 
 
E. Second vs Fourth Quartiles 
0.00  7.81  -4.04  -5.54  -8.87    0.00  8.91  11.64  10.57  12.31    -  0.88  -0.35  -0.52  -0.72 
  0.00  -11.85  -13.36  -16.68      0.00  6.17  6.15  8.49      -  -1.92  -2.17  -1.97 
    0.00  -1.50  -4.83        0.00  3.40  9.53        -  -0.44  -0.51 
      0.00  -3.32          0.00  8.07          -  -0.41 
        0.00            0.00            - 
 
F. Third vs Fourth Quartiles 
0.00  -0.15  0.97  -1.39  -10.97      10.10  13.02  12.97  13.31    -  -0.01  0.07  -0.11  -0.82 
  0.00  1.121  -1.24  -10.82        6.60  7.00  8.91      -  0.17  -0.18  -1.21 
    0.00  -2.36  -11.94          2.45  8.56        -  -0.96  -1.40 
      0.00  -9.58            7.67          -  -1.25 
        0.00 
 
                      - 
 
Note:   1.  The rows and columns of each matrix refer to levels of remuneration. 
  2. Except for the t-statistics, all entries are to be divided by 100.  
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